Incontestable Assignments

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Abstract: We develop a refinement of stability for school choice based on the information students can use to justify appeals. It accommodates partial information about others' preferences, schools' choice functions, and, ex post, the realized assignment. A student has a legitimate complaint if, in every compatible problem and assignment, she can block with some more-preferred school. We characterize complaints by top-sets: a student complains if and only if she is assigned outside the smallest set of preferred schools that cannot all be filled, consistently with her information, by students chosen over her. We then study which mechanisms, for classes of information policies, preclude legitimate complaints. When students observe only their own assignment but may know schools' choice functions, student-optimal deferred acceptance, TTC, and Pareto improvements of student-optimal deferred acceptance induce the same attainable set from each student's perspective.